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aBstRact
under the conditions of macroeconomic instability and the difficulty of forecasting trends in the market 
development, a competitive recovery of the electric power business is possible only by attracting large 
capital investment. Mergers and acquisitions deals that make it possible to concentrate assets and to 
amalgamate the industry business are done through the leveraged buy-out (lBo) scheme. however, 
lBo deals are associated not only with the investor’s risks, but also with the risks of the acquirers 
and vendors. the article presents the authors’ model of risks formalization of lBo deals. it allows for 
consolidating the blocks of key project and financial indicators, parameters of a specific risk, and mac-
roeconomic and sectoral factors. the developed model yields an indicative assessment of the degree of 
risk of lBo deals taking into account the industry specifics. a mechanism for determining the position 
of the creditor in the framework of lBo is proposed as a practical application of this model. the results 
of the study can be used by the management of energy companies, investors and analysts in making 
financial decisions.
Keywords: energy, Leveraged Buy-Out (LBO), Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) deals, risk manage-
ment, risks, risks formalization.
1 intRoduction
at the present time, the energy sector has a complex task of making a transition to a new 
higher level that provides for making the maximum contribution to dynamic socio-economic 
development. it involves a complex structural transformation: an increase in effectiveness of 
traditional and renewable energy use alongside with an increase in the rate of development 
and implementation of decentralized generation programs.
Mergers and acquisitions in the energy sector further the pooling of capital and the con-
solidation and stabilization of the market. however, such deals are not possible without debt 
financing and carry a high level of risk. thus, there is a significant contradiction. on the one 
hand, M&a deals contribute to the stability of the energy market [1]. on the other hand, the 
high level of overall risk [2] discourages investors as it increases the probability of a loss of 
the invested capital, especially in mega-deals.
the authors therefore see it as an important task to develop a model that makes it possible 
to limit the investor’s risk in the deals.
the outcome of this study is the authors’ model capable of formalizing the existing typical 
and specific risks in M&a deals and of minimizing the level of investors risk limiting the 
volume of financing. the results have practical importance and are used for evaluating M&a 
deals of energy companies.
2 RevieW of Russian M&a deals in 2015
currently, the Russian M&a market is characterized by decreased activity and the weaken-
ing confidence of national companies in the effectiveness of such transactions. this is 
primarily due to the high level of macroeconomic instability that is caused by a reduction in 
oil prices and the difficulty and cost of obtaining additional financing.
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the year 20015 showed the worst results in the Russian M&a market over the past ten 
years. total transactions decreased by 29% to $55.8 billion. this was due to a decrease in 
transaction volumes by 19% and a decrease in the average transaction size by 11% [3] 
(fig. 1).
at the same time, the value of transactions in the global M&a market increased by 30% to 
$4.3 trillion with a slight decrease of 3% in the number of deals [3, 4] (fig. 2).
thus, the share of Russia in this market decreased to a minimum value of 1.3% com-
pared with the average of 4.3% over the last decade. cost analysis showed that 10 mega 
deals accounted for 45% of transactions in the Russian M&a market. it is above the global 
level by 26% [3]. industry analysis of the M&a market showed that the energy industry 
continues to dominate in the Russian market. this is despite a decline in deal value from 
$33.1 billion to $16.3 billion and in total – from 73 to 58. the structural characteristics 
of the Russian M&a market by volume and number of deals by sector is presented in 
figure 3.
the total list of the largest (incl. mega) M&a deals of the Russian energy market is dem-
onstrated in table 1.
the most expensive outbound transaction of the global M&a in 2015 was the acquisition 
by the Russian oil company Rosneft of a 49% stake in vendor essar oil ltd for $2.4 million. 
a mega deal to acquire Russian assets by a foreign company took place between silk Road 
fund co ltd and novatek.
figure 1: Russian M&a deals (2010–2015) [3].
figure 2: global M&a deals (2010–2015) [3].
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figure 3: Russia M&a value and volume by sector (2014 & 2015) [4].
table 1: M & a deals in the energy sector (2015).
target acquirer vendor % acquired
value, 
usdm
essar oil ltd Rosneft oil company essar 49.0% 2,400
e.on e & 
p norge
dea deutsche erdoel ag 
(dea)
e.on 100.0% 1,600
yamal lng silk Road fund co ltd novatek 9,9% 1,400
siBuR holding china petrochemical  
corporation (sinopec  
group
leonid Mikhelson; 
kirill shamalov; 
gennady timchenko; 
former and current 
managers
10,0% 1,340
vankorneft ongc videsh limited Rosneft oil company 15,0% 1,300
Russneft nk glencore plc Mikhail gutseriev 49,0% 900
sulzer ltd Renova group Minority shareholders 29.5% 1,032
Wish dst global n/d 16,7% 500
ani  
technologies  
pvt ltd
dst global; tiger global 
Management; falcon edge 
capital lp; softbank corp; 
gic pte ltd; accel part-
ners; Rahul Mehta; yuri 
Milner; steadview capital 
Management hk ltd
n/d 16,7% 400
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3 Risk chaRacteRistics of M&a deals With leveRaged  
Buy-out (lBo) in the eneRgy sectoR
M&a deals implemented on the basis of the lBo financing principles in the energy sector 
are accompanied by a significant number of risks. there are adverse influences of these risks 
on the company’s financial standing. it contributes to a higher probability of default.
transactions in the sphere of energy are characterized by an infinite number of risks. they 
are considered by the authors in the several papers [5–7].
Most risks in M&a deals [8] are based on the absence of the required synergistic effect, 
that is, a failure to reach the planned results of operations after consolidation. these risks 
apply to investment (1, 6), finance (2–4, 6), operating (5–6) and technical (6) business areas 
of the energy company. in addition, usually it is important to highlight a number of external 
hazards (7–8). in the framework of the studies, eight such risks were identified.
1. Revaluation of the acquired company;
2. Withdrawal of the assets of the consolidated company;
3. decrease in the capitalization of the consolidated company (compared to the total capital-
ization of the two companies);
4. Risk of a reduction in the profits of the consolidated company;
5. infrastructure risks: lower effectiveness of the transaction as a result of administrative 
errors in the integration:
a. loss of key employees,
b. deterioration of the corporate culture.
6. industry-specific risks affect all areas of the company [9]. in particular, they can be caused 
by the emergence of technological changes in the industry [9];
7. Market risks involve additional losses due to the volatility of the global feedstock market 
and financial markets;
8. political risks: emergence of a ‘foreign policy setback’ for the implementation of the deal 
by direct or indirect prohibition.
the distribution of risks along the curve of the M&a deal life cycle depending on the volume 
of attracted capital is presented in figure 4.
figure 4: distribution of risks by M&a life cycles.
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it is important to note that for the acquirer in the sphere of energy business there is virtually 
no risk to business reputation of the vendor in this deal. this is primarily due to the capital 
intensity and inertia of the industry, and the practical impossibility of the emergence of new 
major players on the global energy market.
taken together, these risks lead to the deterioration of the general financial condition 
of the acquiring company. use of borrowed capital contributes to the occurrence of credit 
risk.
prevention of the possibility of a default of the consolidated company requires prior fore-
casting of its condition. it must be based on the analysis of potential risks and calculation of 
the optimum ratio in investment terms: distribution of shares in the deal, its price and 
timing.
4 Methodical appRoach to Risks foRMalization of  
M&a deals With lBo foR an eneRgy coMpany
a significant stage in the risk modeling of the lBo deals is the formalization of key risk 
 factors that define financial sustainability of the transaction.
4.1 overview of the existing approaches
there is a sufficient number of widespread concepts of the modeling and selection of risks. 
the most popular of these include:
•	 Microeconomic approach – based on the hypothesis of the impact of the individual quan-
titative and qualitative deal characteristics and its participants on risk. under this ap-
proach, special attention is paid to specific factors of the transaction (corporative and 
capital risks, financial risks of the company–vendor, tax, human risks, the probability of 
the absence of a synergistic effect, etc.).
•	 Macroeconomic approach – based on the influence of government differences on the 
 default of the lBo deals. the approach is widespread in contemporary research. in 
the articles [10, 11] the authors show that such factors as the size of the capital market, the 
current development of legislation have a significant impact on the default risk of lBos.
•	 Market approach – based on market prices of shares, bonds and derivative financial in-
struments for predicting the probability of lBos default. the examples are the studies 
given in Refs. [12, 13]. the study [12] of credit spreads is based on the structural models 
of Merton. in Ref. [12], the authors investigated the dependence of cds spreads on the 
activity in the lBo deals. as a result, it is concluded that the announcement of lBo deals 
leads to an increase in cds spreads. the effectiveness of the market models application 
is shown in Ref. [13].
4.2 Blocks of indicators to risk formalization for an energy company
this paragraph presents the key risk factors grouped in four blocks.
1. Block of project-financial indicators determines the relationship between the lBo risk 
and the main financial parameters. the formation of this block is based on the project 
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approach to lBo deals. it includes methodologically accepted indicators [14] shown in 
table 2. the specificity of the lBo is demonstrated by the use of the debt/eBitda indi-
cator for characterizing the debt load of the consolidated company.
2. Block of the specific risk indicators allows for assessing specific risks in M&a (lBo) 
deals presented in table 3.
3. Block of macroeconomic and industry indicators (table 4) describe the impact of risks 
of the national economy and the state of the industry on the sustainability of lBo deals. 
Within this bock, in order to simplify the model, an integral index of national credit rating 
assigned by rating agencies only is used.
4. Block of financial stress indicators shows the potential impact of the specific risks of lBo 
deals on model stability including debt financing (table 5).
table 2: key risks indicators of project-financial block.
Risk source indicator description
the risk to financial sustainability dscR Minimum dscR throughout the forecast 
period
the risk of project debt load deBitda Maximum debt/eBitda during the 
whole period of the project forecasting
interest rate risk coverage iscR Minimum iscR throughout the forecast 
period
net present value npv net present value of the project
internal rate of return iRR internal rate of return characterizes the 
discount rate 
discounted payback period dpp
the share of equity funds in the 
project
eqfn share of the investment budget, funded by 
the business owners.
the ratio of the loan amount and 
the market value of the collateral
ltv the loan amount lBo/market value  
of shares offered as collateral packages 
(assets) of companies
table 3: key specific risks indicators block.
Risk source indicator description
the type of 
merger
MeRg1
MeRg2
MeRg3
it characterizes the type of merger, depending on the char-
acter (dummy-variable): MeRg1 – horizontal, MeRg2 – 
vertical, MeRg3 – other
Merger geog-
raphy
MeRg4
MeRg5
MeRg6
enabled by means of a dummy-variable: MeRg4 – region-
al, MeRg5 – national, MeRg6 – international
due diligence 
implementer
MeRg7
MeRg8
dummy-variable, which characterizes the level of due 
diligence: MeRg7 – international auditing/consulting com-
pany, MeRg8 – other
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table 4: Block of key macroeconomic and industry indicators.
Risk source indicator description
state of industry secec1
secec2
secec3
it characterizes the current dynamics in the industry. dum-
my variable: secec1 – presence of growth forecasts in 
the industry, secec2 – stable branch, secec3 – expected 
downturn in the industry, the reduction of the market.
the level of the  
national stock market
secec4 stock market capitalization/gdp
country risks secec5
secec6
secec7
indicator level of country risk is defined as a dummy vari-
able national credit rating: 
secec5 - the rating of BBB and above, secec6 – rating 
from BB to BBB, secec7 – rated B and below.
table 5: Block of key financial stress indicators.
Risk source indicator description
the risk of not 
achieving synergy 
dscRstr1 stability of the model to achieve the unexpected of syner-
gies. it is without taking into account the effect of the 
synergistic effect on cash flows.
tax risk dscRstr2 effect of potential tax risks in the fulfillment of obligations 
in the case of the ability to implement them. defined as the 
minimum dscR model to adjust the cash flow implications 
on tax risk (identified as a result of due diligence).
the risk of loss of 
key employees
dscRstr3
dscRstr4
probability and impact of key personnel to the company. 
dummy variables: dscRstr3 – probability of leaving is 
low, dscRstr4 - high impact of key personnel
the risk of joint/
corporate conflicts
dscRstr5
dscRstr6
probability of joint conflict that could disrupt operations, 
recognition of the transaction invalid. dummy variables: 
dscRstr5 – high probability, dscRstr6 – low probability.
antitrust  
(administrative) 
risks
stR1
stR2
dummy variable, which characterizes the degree of risk 
associated with anti-monopoly legislation: stR1 – anti-
monopoly legislation violation risks are absent, or have 
obtained all relevant permits from antitrust authorities, 
stR2 – a high risk of violating antitrust laws.
4.3 integration model of key risks indicator
definition of the key risk factors is the basis for choosing the information and mathematical 
forms of relations between variable indicators. the most widely used forms are:
•	 logit and probit-models (based on regression analysis);
•	 Methods of classification (cluster and discriminant analysis),
•	 advanced information and cybernetic methods (neural networks, fuzzy sets, genetic algo-
rithms, model based on Big data).
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in the framework of this study we used the logit-model presented by eqn (1):
 PD
e i i i
b X=
+
-
1
1 Σ
, (1),
where PD is the probability of an energy company’s default in lBo deals; bi is the coefficient 
of i-th factor; xi is i-th indicator of the risk-factor model.
4.3.1 Results of risk indicator formalization
due to the absence of sufficient statistic data, lBo business plans information, to solve the 
difficult problem of determining the factor coefficients the method of expert analysis was 
used.
the results of the coefficients evaluation are given in table 6.
according to the analysis the greatest impact on the results are produced by the indica-
tors of debt service coverage ratio (dscR) and the debt load on the project (deBitda). it 
includes the sensitivity of the coverage to financial factors and qualitative stress.
5 Methodical appRoach to liMiting the investoR MaRket  
shaRe in M&a deals With lBo in the eneRgy sectoR
this paragraph demonstrates a model for evaluation of lBo deals’ risk. the main purpose of 
this model is to limit the risk born by the investors in the project.
table 6: coefficients of risks indicator formalization for the energy company.
indicator
tendency and 
strength of relation
coeffi-
cient indicator
tendency and 
strength of relation coefficient
dscR +++
−1,785 secec1 +++ −0,713
deBitda
-- 0,927 secec2 + −0,025
iscR + −0,852 secec3 -- 0,459
npv + −0,006 secec4 + −0,054
iRR + −0,008 secec5 ++ −0,619
dpp
- 0,018 secec6 + −0,080
eqfn ++ −0,237 secec7 - 0,107
ltv +++ −0,194 dscRstr1 +++ −1,284
MeRg1 + −0,085 dscRstr2 ++ −0,950
MeRg2 ++ −0,106 dscRstr3 + −0,302
MeRg3
- 0,032 dscRstr4 -- 0,915
MeRg4
- 0,167 dscRstr5 --- 1,162
MeRg5 + −0,082 dscRstr6 + −0,317
MeRg6 + −0,116 stR1 + 0,214
MeRg7 ++ −0,615 stR2 --- −0,850
MeRg8 - 0,091
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5.1  Basic components of the model
there are the several characteristics of lBo deals’ risk [7]:
PD – probability of default. a key indicator characterizing the lBo deal risk level and 
reflecting the potential probability of the investment project default.
LGD – loss given default. expected average relative losses to be incurred by the company in 
case of the lBo deal default. in the case of default this portion of the investment project cost will 
be lost irrecoverably. the reason for introducing this indicator is that in the event of an lBo deal 
default it may be realized in full or in part by means of sale, insurance and option claims, etc.
EAD – exposure at default. this characterizes the absolute value of the lBo deal and is 
determined by the project’s full actual or forecast capital, current and other costs.
5.2 estimation model of limiting investor market share in lBo deal
if the lBo deal is implemented with the attraction of debt financing, it is the question of 
ensuring the stability of the investment organizations in terms of their participation in financ-
ing. it is so important because these projects are capital intensive and their implementation 
involves significant risks that could have a considerable impact on the capital and regulatory 
standards of these organizations.
the investor determines the risk level based on the maximum amount of the losses. it will 
lead to the disruption of operating activities by eqn (2):
 NCAP CCAP TCAP= - , (2),
where NCAP is the capital of the investor, the loss of which would not lead to insolvency; 
CCAP is the current energy company capital; TCAP is the target capital to cover overall risk 
of the energy company.
the volume of the target capital is evaluated using the credit rating of the energy company. 
each credit rating may be assigned with a certain level of default probability corresponding 
to it depending on the forecasting horizon. one of the variants of correspondence between the 
credit rating and default probability is presented in table 7 [5, 6].
the following limitation is the ead volume. in this study, it is the potential volume of obli-
gations of the acquirer (at the time of default). therefore, the total maximum amount of creditor 
participation in the lBo budget can be defined as the minimum of the quantities by eqn (3):
 Volume of investments = ( )min NCAP EAD; . (3)
table 7: correspondence between the probability of default and credit rating.
Rating 1-y pd 3-y pd 5-y pd
aaa 0,008% 0,03% 0,1%
aa 0,04% 0,16% 0,28%
a 0,16% 0,4% 0,58%
BBB 0,3% 1,4% 3%
BB 1,15% 8,6% 15%
B 5,8% 15,4% 32,6%
ccc or lower 26,57% 45,5% 60%
914 G. Chebotareva, et al., Int. J. Sus. Dev. Plann. Vol. 13, No. 6 (2018)
thus, the limiting market share of the investor can be determined by eqn (4):
 IMS
NCAP EAD
BDG
=
( )min ;
, (4),
where IMS is the market share of the investor in the lBo deal; BDG is the total lBo budget.
5.2.1 additional components to investor limitation
the limiting market share of the investor can be corrected additionally. it depends on the 
level of risk (determined by the pd) and lgd. for the purposes of further indication, these 
indicators were put together based on the level of expected losses (el) in eqn (5):
 EL PD LGD= ⋅  (5)
table 8 shows the distribution of the el values, depending on the risk level.
Based on the el-level, it is proposed that additional correction (k) to the lBo budget be 
implemented. the factor k allows for reducing the creditor market share in the deal with a 
high level of risk (table 9).
the final outcome of this study is the summarized formula of the investor market share in 
the lBo deal. equation (6) makes it possible to form a limit of the total borrowed capital in 
accordance with the deal risk level:
 IMS
NCAP K EAD
BDGK
=
⋅( )min ;
 (6),
where IMSK is the corrected value of IMS.
table 8: EL-distribution by the probability of default (pd) and lgd.
LG
D
, %
PD, %
0–0, 
04
0, 
05–0,16
0, 
17–0,3
0, 
31–1,15
1, 
16–5,8
5, 
81–26,57
26, 
58–50
50, 
01–100
0,1–5 0,00% 0,01% 0,02% 0,06% 0,29% 1,33% 2,50% 5,00%
5,1–15 0,01% 0,02% 0,05% 0,17% 0,87% 3,99% 7,50% 15,00%
15,1–30 0,01% 0,05% 0,09% 0,35% 1,74% 7,97% 15,00% 30,00%
30,1–50 0,02% 0,08% 0,15% 0,58% 2,90% 13,29% 25,00% 50,00%
50,1–65 0,03% 0,10% 0,20% 0,75% 3,77% 17,27% 32,50% 65,00%
65,1–80 0,03% 0,13% 0,24% 0,92% 4,64% 21,26% 40,00% 80,00%
80,1–90 0,04% 0,14% 0,27% 1,04% 5,22% 23,91% 45,00% 90,00%
90,1–100 0,04% 0,16% 0,30% 1,15% 5,80% 26,57% 50,00% 100,00%
table 9: correspondence between the K-factor and EL-level.
EL 0–0,05 0,06–0,1 0,11–0,15 0,16–0,3 0,31–0,7 0,71–1,2 1,21–2 2,1–3,5
k 1 0,99 0,97 0,95 0,93 0,9 0,85 0,8
EL 3,51–5 5,01–8 8,01–10 10,01–25 25,01–32 32,01–45 45,01–75 75,01–100
k 0,75 0,65 0,5 0,35 0,1 0,005 0,0001 0
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6 conclusions
the important part in the risk assessment process is building a model that allows for a quan-
titative evaluation. at the next stages this model can be used for the purposes of measuring 
the risk, forming the cost and target capital yield, assessment of investors’ sustainability [15].
this problem solution is proposed for the evaluation of the probability of default as an 
internationally accepted measure of credit risk. the introduced model includes the evaluation 
of deal-financial indicators, specific risks indicators, macroeconomic and sectoral indicators 
of financial stress. as the result of the integration of these indicators into the model, it is pos-
sible to obtain the overall risk indicator. in practice, it means the creditor market share in the 
total budget of the deal. a mechanism of reducing of the debt participation of a creditor in 
deals with a high level of risk.
the main directions of further research are:
•	 formation of a statistical sample size on real lBos. it will make it possible to replace 
expert opinion with a statistically reasonable measure of the coefficients.
•	 explanation of the sensitivity level to calculate the el-intervals to improve the quality of 
risk and K-factor.
•	 econometric explanation of the el-matrix.
•	 development of a pricing model of the borrowed funds (taking into account the level of 
lBo risk).
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